We examined the impact of the distribution of information regarding social groups on the formation of shared stereotypes within triads in two studies. Three-person groups discussed which of three groups (A, B, and C) was the most able and the most sociable. In Study 1, some of the information about these three groups was available to all group members (shared) whereas the remainder was distributed among group members (unique). Based on the total profile, there was more evidence of group A being sociable and of group B being able than of A being able and B sociable. In Study 1 (n ¼ 58), sampling was manipulated as 'representative' (information in line with the overall differences was shared) or 'unrepresentative' (only information contradicting these differences was shared). In a third condition, all items of information were shared. Emerging stereotypes were directly influenced by sampling of information independently of the discussion. As well as this, the discussion consensualized initial stereotypes. In Study 2 (n ¼ 52), sampling was always unrepresentative and we manipulated the labels associated with the target groups in such a way that the stereotype associated with the label was either inconsistent or consistent with the overall differences between the target groups. In the inconsistent condition, participants were more likely to discuss information that violated stereotypical expectations, and to be less influenced by sampling as a result of discussion. Altogether, these findings suggest that information sampling directly affects the consensualization of social stereotypes.
that of content. By contrast, other studies specifically investigating the formation of consensual stereotypes Schaller & Conway, 1999) have ignored the question of sampling. In this paper, we shall precisely try to address the influence of the sampling of information about social groups on stereotype consensualization.
Before doing so however, it is important to critically examine some of the main findings drawn from the decision-making literature, in which the concept of sampling has been most extensively studied, and its applicability to situations of stereotype consensualization.
Sampling and Hidden Profiles in Decision-Making Groups
In the studies documented in the literature on small group decision making, groups are generally invited to collectively make a decision (e.g. choosing the best of two candidates, A and B). Usually, one of the options (e.g. choosing candidate A) is preferable based on the sum of information collectively available to the group. Sampling is thought to be biased if information regarding the available options is distributed in such a way that information supporting the best option is not distributed evenly among group members. In some extreme cases, information supporting the less desirable option is shared among all group members and information supporting the most desirable option is available to only one of them. As a consequence, each individual group member may actually have more information supporting the 'worse' option than information supporting the optimal option although the latter type of information is more numerous and is collectively available to the small group. This case is illustrated in Figure 1 : although, there are twice as many items of information supporting an hypothetical option (B) than another (A), each group member possesses more information supporting A prior to discussion.
Of course, the discussion may be viewed as an opportunity for pooling the information that is not available to all group members (information supporting B in this example). In doing so, groups may hope to discover the 'hidden profile' and eventually to reach an optimal decision. In contrast to this idealistic view, research on group decision making (Stasser, 1999; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996) suggests that when information is distributed among group members, discussants rarely pool the totality of the information they solely possess. On the contrary, they tend to focus on the information that is already shared. Hence, although discussion is supposed to contribute to the implementation of optimal decisions, it may actually fail to achieve this purpose. Note that this should not necessarily be interpreted as reflecting 'faulty' or 'biased' information processing. As Haslam (2001) has noted, sampling can be subjectively viewed as informative in itself: if a piece of information is shared within Figure 1 . A typical hidden profile Note: Each box represents an item of information relevant to a hypothetical decision involving two options, A and B. The items labelled A1 to A3 support option A whereas those labelled B1 to B6 support option B a group, it is generally the outcome of a meaningful social process. It can therefore be considered as sensible and rational to devote special attention to it.
Biased Sampling and Stereotype Consensualization
Are the notions of 'biased sampling' and 'hidden profiles' applicable to the consensualization of stereotypes in natural intergroup contexts? Stereotypes are not objectively true (unbiased) or false (biased). Accuracy results from an inherently relative process of social validation: stereotypes can be viewed as accurate to the extent that they allow the perceiver to make sense of a specific social context (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Oakes & Reynolds, 1997) . When applied to the formation of consensual stereotypes, the notions of biased and accurate sampling should therefore not be considered in terms of an objective social reality but as relative to the specific pool of information on which these interpretive processes can operate. More specifically, we suggest that a specific sampling of information is biased to the extent that:
1. A subset of the information available to members of a group is more likely to be shared than the rest of this information. 2. This subset tends to consistently depict the group in ways that contradict, or are unrepresentative of, the overall profile of the group (as determined by the total pool of information collectively available to all group members).
This is not at all an uncommon phenomenon. For example, the media can elicit this very kind of outcome. Consider the stereotypes of newly immigrant groups held by members of the 'native' population. What type of information is collectively available to members of majority groups in these situations? The information communicated through the mass media will often emphasize highly salient, negative behaviours (Greenberg, Bradley, & Brand, 1994; Ruscher, 2001; Van Dijk, 1991) . These behaviours will tend to be communicated, shared with others and described as reflecting essential dispositions of out-group members more than their positive counterparts (Maass, 1999; Thompson, Judd, & Park, 2000) . On the other hand, members of majority groups are likely to experience many positive, or at least neutral, experiences, with members of these immigrant groups in their day-to-day encounters e.g. as co-workers, shopkeepers, clerks, etc. These experiences will probably be more private and personal. For example, evidence that a particular immigrant shopkeeper is especially generous will be limited to those who interact with this shopkeeper, while instances of extreme delinquent or aggressive behaviour will be publicized in the press and be more likely to be communicated (Van Dijk, 1987) . Hence, there are grounds for suspecting that the sampling of information regarding immigrant groups can be negatively biased in such a way that negative information is more likely to be shared than positive information. More generally, if some stereotypical traits (e.g. negative traits) are more likely to be communicated when describing out-group members, biased sampling is likely to occur. Recent evidence (Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002) precisely suggests that traits differ in the extent to which they are 'communicable'. Now that we have considered the applicability of the notion of biased sampling to the consensualization of stereotypes, let us consider some of the reasons why shared information has such a disproportionate impact on group decision and judgment. According to models of biased sampling (for reviews, see Stasser, 1999; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996) , two main processes may account for this phenomenon. These two processes are not incompatible and can jointly explain this effect (Stasser, 1999) . a. Collective sampling (Stasser & Titus, 1985 : according to this interpretation, greater shared information is more likely to be discussed than unshared information and this leads to group 758 Olivier Klein et al.
decisions predominantly based on the former. Two factors make shared information more likely to be discussed than unshared information. The first is trivial: more group members are aware of shared information and therefore likely to make it available to the group. Second, if shared information supports a specific alternative, group members may be tempted to prefer this alternative. This preference will in turn affect the discussion as they will tend to report (shared) information supporting their opinions. b. 'Common knowledge effect' (Gigone & Hastie, 1993 : group members may combine their opinions regardless of the arguments exchanged in the discussion. According to this model, sampling only has an impact on group decisions through its influence on predecisional preferences.
In line with this analysis, Gigone and Hastie have provided evidence that group judgments could be described as a simple averaging of participants' initial judgments. In their studies, the pooling of information did not affect group judgment and choice over and above initial preferences.
Let us now apply these theoretical considerations to discussions about the characteristics of social groups. We shall consider situations in which several group members enter a discussion about a previously unknown out-group, each having different items of information regarding this group, some shared (i.e. available to all group members), some unique (i.e. available to only one group member). Based on the literature on group decision making, we can expect the sampling of information regarding these social groups to influence the emerging content of stereotypes through its impact on predecisional preferences. Both models we have reviewed indeed suggest that discussion is unlikely to radically modify these initial preferences. On the contrary, discussion may actually reinforce the preferences induced by sampling: as people exchange information consistent with these preferences (in line with the collective sampling hypothesis), they may be persuaded of their validity and endorse them even more strongly. The latter outcome would be consistent with the group polarization literature (Brauer et al., 2001; Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977; Wetherell, 1987) .
The Emergence of Consensus
So far, we have only addressed the first aspect of consensualization, the content of the emerging stereotypes. What about consensus itself? has addressed this issue in the context of self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . According to this theory, when a social identity is salient, discussions between members of a common in-group are likely to increase consensus because individuals are motivated to agree with other in-group members. Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds et al. have indeed observed that when their identity as Australians was made salient, members of a small discussion groups reached more consensual views of a target group than when it was not. In line with this theoretical framework, when, as in group decision-making studies, the discussion's purpose is to form a consensual choice, participants should be motivated to agree with others and their individual judgments should therefore be more consistent with those of other group members after than before discussion.
More crucially, the emergence of consensus following discussion may reinforce group members' initial convictions. According to several theories of social influence, reality is socially validated and consensus within an in-group provides a criterion of subjective validity (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987; Festinger, 1950; Haslam, 2001; Moscovici, 1976; Sherif, 1936; Turner, 1991) . Hence, when other ingroup members agree on a specific representation of a target group, the perceiver should be more likely to adhere to this representation as well (for confirmations of these assumptions, see Haslam et al., 1996; Stangor et al., 2001) . Moreover, this greater consensus should make these preferences more certain after than before discussion. This should be true regardless of sampling.
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STUDY 1 Overview and Hypotheses
In order to examine the validity of this analysis in the context of the consensualization of stereotypes, we chose a paradigm closely resembling those used in research on group decision making (for reviews, see : Stasser, 1999; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996) . We shall consider here small group discussions about representations of two groups, A and B, about which information is available in the form of typical behaviours that are diagnostic of one of two independent traits, ability and sociability. On the basis of these behaviours, these groups differ on these two trait dimensions in such a way that there is more evidence of A being sociable and of B being able than of A being able and of B being sociable. To simplify the terminology, we shall label judgments and behaviours consistent with these overall differences 'primary' and judgments and behaviours consistent with the opposite pattern (B being more sociable and less able than A) 'secondary'. Consider a situation in which primary information is generally shared within the discussion group, and secondary information generally unshared. This situation, which corresponds to the 'representative' condition of this study, is depicted in Figure 2a : each box in this figure represents an item of information, with the unshaded boxes representing primary information and the shaded boxes representing secondary information. As can be seen, such a distribution implies that each group member has more primary than secondary information. Hence, group members' preferences should tend to be consistent with the overall profiles. By contrast, if primary information is unshared, and secondary information shared (as in the example depicted in Figure 2b , which corresponds to the 'unrepresentative' condition of the study), the sampling of information regarding the two groups is biased: indeed each group member has more secondary than primary information prior to discussion, although there is by definition more primary than secondary information at a group level. This should bias initial preferences in favour of secondary information. Altogether, the application of models of biased sampling suggests that small groups having to reach a common judgment on traits descriptive of another group should be influenced by the sampling of Figure 2 . Distribution of information regarding groups A and B in (a) the representative condition and (b) the unrepresentative condition Note: Each box represents a piece of information with P1 to P18 representing primary information and S1 to S8 representing secondary information 760 Olivier Klein et al. information regarding this group. If shared and unique information support different options (as in these two cases), their choices and judgments should tend to be consistent with shared information even after discussion. Finally, we expect consensus to be higher after than before discussion and we expect group members to feel more certain about their decision after than before discussion.
Method
Participants and Design
174 students (140 women and 34 men, mean age ¼ 19.90) at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, participated in the study as a partial requirement for an introductory psychology class. A total of 58 triads were run. No constraints on the gender composition of the triads were placed. The basic design was a 3 (sampling: all shared, representative, unrepresentative) Â 2 (time: before, after discussion) with repeated measures on the last factor. Several more complex designs were used as a function of the dependent measures (see below).
Pilot Study
In order to elaborate the profiles of the target groups, a list of 100 behaviours associated with sociability and intellectual ability was constructed. This list was submitted to 25 participants from the same population who were asked to report the behaviours that were most descriptive of each trait. A second list was created including behaviours descriptive of unsociability and inability. Fifteen participants were then asked to pick the 20 behaviours that were most diagnostic of these traits. Based on these pilot studies, 26 behaviours were selected (10 diagnostic of sociability, 10 diagnostic of ability, three diagnostic of unsociability, three diagnostic of inability). Those were the behaviours that had been selected most frequently for each trait. Finally 24 neutral traits (i.e. judged as nondiagnostic of these traits) were also inserted. Altogether, 50 traits were therefore included.
Profiles
Participants read the profiles of three groups of friends labelled A, B, and C. Profiles were constructed using the 50 behaviours. Overall, the profiles contained 17 items of information describing typical behaviours attributed to groups A and B and 16 to group C. Each behaviour was presented as a statement attributed to one of the group members (e.g. 'Antoine: We feel good when we are in the company of others'). This made the statements appear to be part of a dialogue. The exact composition of the profiles is presented in the last column of Table 1 . As can be seen from this column, there were more behaviours diagnostic of ability and fewer behaviours diagnostic of inability for group B than for group A and more behaviours diagnostic of sociability and fewer diagnostic of unsociability for group A than group B. Hence, altogether, A was presented as more sociable and less able than B. The profile for group C was only composed of neutral behaviours. This group was only included because we wanted to avoid the very rapid emergence of consensus, which would not have allowed us to investigate the impact of the discussion on the emergence of shared stereotypes. For this reason, results involving this group will not be discussed.
Stereotype consensualization 761
There were three experimental conditions. In all conditions, the totality of the information about these three groups was distributed among members of the small discussion group. Each item of information was therefore available to at least one member of the small group and the total profile was collectively available to the group. The main manipulation concerned the number of participants who received each type of information. In the all shared condition, each participant received the totality of the information. In the representative condition and in the unrepresentative distributions, each participant received only a subset of this information: thus some of it was shared while the rest was dispersed (unique). However, and as in the studies by Titus (1985, 1987) , each participant had the same number of items of information of each type: for example, although they did not receive the same information about group B, all members of each small group had the same number of items describing this group as 'able' regardless of sampling.
In the representative condition, each individual group member had more primary information (i.e. information consistent with the overall differences) than secondary information (i.e. inconsistent with the overall differences). As can be seen on Figure 2a , six items of primary information and two items of secondary information were shared whereas the rest of the information was unique. This meant that, prior to discussion, participants each had 10 items of primary information (six shared and four unique) and only four items of secondary information (two shared, two unique).
In the unrepresentative condition, a hidden profile was created. Each individual group member had more secondary than primary information. As can be seen from Figure 2b , all eight items of secondary information were shared whereas all 18 items of primary information were unique. Consequently, each participant had only six items of primary information.
Whereas Figure 2a and 2b provide a simple overview of the sampling manipulation, Table 1 displays the exact number of behaviours of each subtype distributed to group members as a function of condition and their consequences for each individual group member (displayed in the 'indiv' columns). The last two lines report the sum of these frequencies for primary and secondary information respectively (for example, in the all shared condition, the number 18 corresponding to the number of items of primary information is equal to six (A sociable) þ six (B able) þ three (A unable) þ three (B unsociable)). 762 Olivier Klein et al.
Within the 'representative' and 'unrepresentative' conditions, two different orders of cue distribution were used. As well as this, the profiles were distributed in two different orders. The purpose of these manipulations, which were independent of the sampling factor, was to ensure that observed effects would not be limited to a particular distribution of the cues or to the order in which profiles were distributed. As these factors did not influence the results, they are not mentioned further.
Procedure
Upon entering the laboratory, groups of three participants were seated randomly around a table by a female experimenter blind to conditions. Their seating determined the information they received. Each group was randomly allocated to one of the three experimental conditions. Participants were told that they would receive the profiles of three groups named A, B, and C. The profiles were presented as the transcription of a discussion in which group members had described their group. Participants were instructed to read them individually for 10 min. They were informed that they would be asked to report on a questionnaire their impressions regarding the sociability and ability of these groups. Sociability was defined as 'liking the company of others, to be open to others and to enjoy group activities'. Ability was defined as 'the capacity to achieve demanding tasks, to manage difficult situations in an efficient way and to possess the necessary abilities'. Participants were also informed that they would discuss their impressions with the other group members.
After the 10 min had elapsed, participants were asked to report individually their impressions of each group on the first questionnaire (see below). They were told that they would have to collectively engage in a discussion whose purpose would be to determine which group they found the most 'sociable' and 'able' with the other students.
The experimenter explicitly told the participants that the pooling of unique information was important to make accurate decisions: 'I wish to emphasize that, generally, in real life, when a group discusses about another person or group, its members rarely possess the same information: it is therefore crucial that people exchange the information they possess during discussions'.
Participants then engaged in a discussion about one of the two traits (the most sociable or the most able group). They were asked to 'discuss their impressions of the group they found most sociable (able) with the other group members until they reached a common decision.' They were also encouraged to provide arguments during discussion. They discussed until they estimated that they had reached a consensus (up to 10 min). They then engaged in a discussion on the other trait (able or sociable). The order in which the traits were discussed was counterbalanced. All groups reached a consensus on each trait within 10 min.
Participants then answered the second questionnaire individually. Once this step was completed, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Dependent Measures
The first questionnaire contained statements describing each group on the sociability ('warm', 'sociable') and on the ability dimensions ('intelligent', 'able'). Scores varied between 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much). Participants were then asked to pick the group that they viewed as most sociable and able and to indicate how certain they were of their choice (1 ¼ 'not at all', 7 ¼ 'very much'). In order to better understand results on trait judgments, we computed the difference between primary and secondary judgments. This accuracy index estimates the tendency to perceive the group in line with the overall differences between the two groups. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 33, 755-777 (2003) The second questionnaire contained the same items and measures of free recall: participants were asked to write all the information they could remember about the groups. They were also asked to report the choices made by their group on each dimension.
Results
Pooling
Recordings of the discussions were coded by two independent judges. Each judge recorded each time a behaviour present in the profile was mentioned in the discussion. One judge coded all the recordings. A second judge coded only 25% of the recordings. In view of the high level of reliability between the two ratings (Cohens's Kappa > 0.80), the ratings of the first judge were kept for the remaining 75%. We computed two scores measuring respectively the likelihood that a shared and an unshared item would be pooled during discussion. The ratio between the number of shared (unshared) items pooled during discussion divided by the total number of shared (unshared) items was computed. These scores were submitted to a sampling Â sharedness (shared, not shared) mixed ANOVA which revealed a main effect of sharedness, F(1, 57) ¼ 5.21, p < 0.05. On average, an item of shared information was more likely to be pooled (M ¼ 0.45) than an item of unshared information (M ¼ 0.34).
Judgments
For both dimensions, ability and sociability, the two scales were averaged (rs < 0.60) and their means computed in each group. Did sampling and discussion affect the content of stereotypes? In order to answer this question, these means were submitted to a sampling Â information type (primary, secondary) Â time (before, after discussion) Â dimension (ability, sociability) 1 mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last three factors. Judgments of the sociability of group B and of the ability of group A were classified as 'secondary' and their counterparts as 'primary'.
2
As expected, this analysis revealed a strong effect of sampling on accuracy, as indicated by an interaction between sampling and type, F(2, 55) ¼ 47.97, p < 0.001: groups' judgments were less accurate in the unrepresentative condition than in the two other conditions as confirmed by a planned contrast (t(55) ¼ 3.70, p < 0.01). This effect was not moderated by time (the sampling Â time Â type interaction did not reach significance, F(2, 55) < 1, ns) as can be seen in Figure 3 . In other words, the discussion did not seem to have an impact on the general tendency to make 'biased' judgments in the unrepresentative condition.
Finally, there was an effect involving information type: unsurprisingly, judgments on primary traits were higher than judgments on secondary traits, F(1, 55) ¼ 122.1, p < 0.001.
Overall, this analysis, comparable to Brauer et al.'s (2001) , seems to indicate that polarization did not take place.
Consensus and Certainty
Intra-group Variance. We also examined the impact of sampling and discussion on the level of intragroup consensus on these judgments. For a particular judgmental scale (i.e. the composite scores of sociability and ability respectively), this consensus can be operationalized as a function of the variance in judgments across group members: the greater the variance, the lower the consensus. A mixed sampling Â time Â dimension Â information type ANOVA on this variable revealed an effect of time, F(1, 55) ¼ 8.35, p < 0.005 indicating that variance decreased after discussion (M ¼ 0.99) as compared to before discussion (M ¼ 1.32). An unexpected effect of the judgmental dimension was also observed, F(1, 55) ¼ 9.26, p < 0.005. Overall, the variance was higher on judgments of sociability than of ability (Ms ¼ 1.36 and 0.96 respectively).
3 No effect involving sampling reached significance.
Certainty. Judgments of certainty were entered in a mixed ANOVA. This analysis only revealed an effect of time, F(1, 55) ¼ 30.71, p < 0.001: on average, group members were more certain of their judgment after (M ¼ 6.08) than before discussion (M ¼ 5.61).
Individual and Group Choices
Comparison Between Inter-individual and Inter-group Consensus. Another approach to consensualization involves comparing the level of agreement between participants before discussion to this agreement among groups, after discussion. An increase in this level would be indicative of consensualization.
4
In each condition, we counted the number of participants who chose group A, B, and C as the most sociable and able group respectively. In the two biased conditions, incorrect choices were infrequent This may be due to the fact that dimensions linked to ability offer fewer degrees of freedom for interpretation than dimensions linked to sociability and morality (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1995; Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995; Mackie & Smith, 1998; Otten & Bar-Tal, 2002). 4 This method violates one of the assumptions of log-linear analysis as observations before discussion cannot be treated as independent. However, we chose to accept this violation in order to make our results comparable with previous studies of consensualization, which used a similar criterion (cf. .
Stereotype consensualization 765 and sometimes absent, especially in the second phase. Hence, incorrect choices (B and C for judgments of sociability, A and C for judgments of ability) were aggregated and choices were recoded as correct or incorrect. This procedure yielded a 3 (sampling: all shared, representative, unrepresentative) Â 2 (phase: individual, group) Â 2 (trait: sociability, ability) Â 2 (choice: correct, incorrect) contingency table, that was submitted to a hierarchical log-linear analysis.
Choices were more likely to be correct in the all shared (87% for the individual phase, 100% for the group phase) and the representative condition (84% for individuals, 100% for the group phase) than in the unrepresentative condition (35% for both phases), as testified by a significant dependence between sampling and choice, LR(2) ¼ 155.44, p < 0.001.
As well as this, the presence of a marginally significant dependence between phase and choice suggests that choices were on average more correct in groups after discussion (77%) than among individuals before discussion (67%), LR(2) ¼ 3.68, p ¼ 0.055.
However, this effect was dependent on sampling: whereas groups tended to make even better decisions than individuals in the all shared and representative conditions, it was not the case in the unrepresentative condition, as shown by a reliable dependence between phase and condition, LR(2) ¼ 14.98, p < 0.001. In this latter condition, the group phase did not increase decision quality relative to the individual phase.
The only other significant effect was due to the trait factor: participants were more likely to be correct when deciding about the most sociable than about the most able group, LR(1) ¼ 7.12, p < 0.01.
Recall
Behaviours recalled by participants were paired by two independent judges with the initial profiles (Cohen's kappa ¼ 0.90). The sum of shared and unshared items recalled correctly in each group was submitted to a sampling Â sharedness mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor: this analysis only yielded an effect of sharedness with shared information being more likely to be recalled than unshared information (Ms ¼ 0.60 and 0.48 respectively, F(1, 38) ¼ 18.44, p < 0.01).
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine whether the distribution of information regarding a social group could affect the formation of consensual stereotypes within small discussion groups. The results suggest a positive answer to this question.
First, sampling affected initial preferences and choices. When sampling was unrepresentative of the overall information, participants were less likely to make correct choices and to view the groups in line with the overall differences than when all the information was shared, or when sampling was representative of these differences.
Second, sampling affected discussion content and recall. Generally, shared information was more likely to be discussed and recalled than unshared information. This is in line with prior findings (Stasser & Titus, 1985 .
Third, sampling still affected group decisions and judgments after discussion. More specifically, group preferences after discussion reflected group members' initial preferences rather than the overall profiles. Interestingly, groups made slightly more correct decisions after than before discussion but only in the all shared and representative conditions, that is when their decisions were generally correct before discussion. In the unrepresentative conditions, in which choices were split, discussion did not improve the quality of decisions. Hence, discussion did not have a unilateral impact on decision 766 Olivier Klein et al. quality: rather, it served to maintain the group's initial preferences, whether they were in line with the overall profile or not.
Most interestingly, participants' mean endorsement of the stereotype seemed unaffected by the discussion. This is inconsistent with some of the results obtained by Brauer et al. (2001) , who found that when information regarding a single target group was evenly dispersed among members of a small discussion group (like in the present study), group members tended to ignore inconsistent information and their views became even more consistent with the initial stereotype after discussion. The inconsistency between Brauer et al.'s findings and those of the present study may be due to procedural differences: in their study, contrary to ours, no consensus goal was imposed on subjects. This may have facilitated polarization by increasing participant's propensity to present relevant evidence and arguments in favour of their position (cf. Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977) .
Nonetheless, the near absence of differences in pre-and post-discussion mean judgments is interesting in itself in that it shows that the opportunity for sharing information offered by the discussion was not used for forming more accurate views of the target groups. As in previous research on small group judgments (Gigone & Hastie, 1993) , discussion seems to have little impact on postdiscussion choices and average judgments. In this respect, this study shows the applicability of the common knowledge effect to the formation of consensual stereotypes in small groups.
Although the mean endorsement of the stereotypes was not affected by group discussion, discussion served to consensualize pre-discussion preferences by making them less variable (within the group) and more certain. Hence, the present findings should not be interpreted as evidence that groups do not play a role in the construction of stereotypes (cf. Haslam, 1997; Oakes et al., 1994; Thomson et al., 2000) . Quite to the contrary, they are implicated in the transition from individual to social stereotypes.
In spite of the interest of these preliminary results, the generality of the effects observed in this study can be questioned. As already noted, in this first study, we adapted a paradigm used in the decisionmaking literature and explicitly asked participants to reach an agreement. Hence, the observation of lower within-group variance after discussion may be considered as simply reflecting compliance with the experimenter. Besides, the presence of a consensus goal, as in earlier decision-making studies, may have reinforced the biasing impact of sampling. Along these lines, Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir (2001) have shown that the impact of shared information on group decisions was greater when groups had a consensus norm rather than a critical norm. Hence, one of the goals of Study 2 was to examine whether consensualization took place even in the absence of an explicit consensus goal.
As well as this, this first study examined the impact of sampling on the formation of new consensual stereotypes. Participants did not have expectations or beliefs regarding the traits likely to be shared within the target groups. Yet, when discussing out-groups, individuals often hold preconceptions and beliefs regarding these groups. What would be the impact of having such beliefs on the consensualization process in situations of biased sampling of information? Do existing stereotypes counteract the impact of biased sampling? Or do they reinforce it?
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to answer these questions. In this study, we shall focus our interest on the role of stereotypic expectancies in the context of biased sampling as these situations seem most likely to lead to the formation of 'biased' stereotypes (cf. Study 1).
Relevant to this issue, Ruscher and Duval (1998) have observed that when individuals communicate about a target about whom they possess a mixed set of information (both congruent and incongruent with the stereotype associated with the target's category), they communicate relatively more about the incongruent attributes if they know that their audience does not possess the same information as themselves than if they expect the audience to share the same information about this target. According to Ruscher and Duval, in the former case, perceivers feel pressured to communicate 'accurate' information and therefore devote more attention to the incongruent information. This interpretation can be questioned: viewing stereotype-consistent information as less accurate than stereotype-inconsistent information is contestable (for thorough discussions of this issue, see: Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes & Reynolds, 1997) . Rather than being framed in terms of accuracy, Ruscher and Duval's findings may gain from being interpreted in terms of pragmatic theories of conversational interaction (Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1995) . According to these theories, communicators are expected to provide relevant information, that is information that can significantly improve the knowledge base of the audience. In intra-group contexts, stereotypes can be considered as mutual knowledge: audiences belonging to the in-group are expected to endorse them. However, when all information is expected to be shared, stereotype-consistent information is not more conversationally relevant than stereotype-inconsistent information since both types of information are already known by the audience. Moreover, there seems to be an overall tendency to communicate stereotypeconsistent information as a way of fostering a sense of group identity (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty et al., 1998) . By contrast, when the audience is expected to possess different information from the communicator, stereotype-consistent information may be considered as of little conversational relevance compared to stereotype-inconsistent information, given that this latter type of information is unshared. For example, if a perceiver knows that a group of engineers is composed of people who are very intelligent and very sociable, and if the audience is expected to have different information regarding this group, it may be more conversationally relevant to insist on the sociability of this group than on its intelligence: after all, inasmuch as the audience probably perceives engineers as intelligent (or knows that they are perceived as such), it is not very informative to communicate this presumed 'fact'. Hence, all other things being equal (e.g. social identity-related motives), we can expect communicators to find stereotype-inconsistent information more relevant than stereotypeconsistent information when information regarding the target is sampled among participants.
STUDY 2 Overview and Hypotheses
The second study uses the exact same sampling of information as in the 'unrepresentative' condition of Study 1.
To investigate the impact of pre-existing expectations, we consider three situations: (a) sampling is biased in such a way that primary information (e.g. diagnostic of the sociability of group A and of the ability of group B) is in line with the expectations associated with the group labels (on the basis of a pretest, group A will be labelled as 'pétanque players' 5 and group B as 'statisticians'); or (b) sampling is biased in such a way that primary information tends to contradict these expectations (e.g. group B will be labelled as 'pétanque players' and group A as 'statisticians'). In these two situations, the sampling of information regarding the two groups does not change; only the label associated with the two groups is manipulated. In a third condition, no label will be presented (as in Study 1).
To remain consistent with the terminology used in Study 1, note that, regardless of the label, information consistent with the overall profile (e.g. diagnostic of the sociability of group A and ability of group B) will be called 'primary' and information inconsistent with this profile 'secondary'. The sampling being biased, primary information is therefore unique whereas secondary information is shared.
Given that category labels tend to bias information processing (Fiske, 1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) , we expect sampling to affect judgments in a direction consistent with the label: thus in the no label condition, groups should be viewed less in line with the overall differences (i.e. A as more sociable and less able than B) than in the consistent condition (Hypothesis 1a) but as more in line with these differences than in the inconsistent condition (Hypothesis 1b).
More importantly, the above analysis suggests that knowing that one possesses different information from an audience inclines group members to devote more attention to information that contradicts pre-existing shared representations, such as stereotypes. Assuming that group members all expect to have different information from their audience, discussants should therefore discuss more unique ('primary') information, and less shared ('secondary') information when it is inconsistent than consistent with the label (Hypothesis 2a). In the absence of a label, these values should be intermediate with participants simply discussing more shared than unshared information (Hypothesis 2b).
This should in turn affect judgments after discussion: in the inconsistent condition, greater communication of primary (unique) information should lead to a greater 'accuracy' as compared to a situation in which no label is associated with the group (Hypothesis 3a) . By contrast, in the consistent condition, greater communication of shared (secondary) information should lead to views of the target groups that are less in line with the overall differences between these groups (Hypothesis 3b).
Besides, as in Study 1, we expect certainty to increase after discussion (Hypothesis 4), and withingroup variances on trait judgments to decrease as a function of discussion (Hypothesis 5).
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 156 undergraduate psychology students (divided in 52 triads) taking part in the study as part of a course requirement. The data of four triads could not be taken into account because of failures to complete the questionnaire properly or because one of the participants took part twice in the study. There were three experimental conditions as a function of the labels attached to the groups (no label, consistent, inconsistent).
Profiles and Procedure
The profiles were the same as in Study 1. In the three conditions, the sampling was identical to that used in the 'unrepresentative' sampling condition of Study 1. The same procedure was generally followed with a few exceptions.
First, a different cover story was used: participants were told that 'this study was made in collaboration with a member of the social psychology staff in order to determine which characteristics were common to people performing a variety of activities. In order to progress in this study, many had been observed and three of them had been randomly selected.' Actually the same three groups were used for all participants. In the consistent and inconsistent conditions, one of the groups was described as members of a pétanque club. The second was described as 'researchers working at the National Institute of Statistics' and the third as a group of people observed when they were waiting for a train. In both the consistent and inconsistent conditions, the group C profile used in Study 1 was attributed this neutral label. In each case, the labels were presented before participants read the profiles. Pretesting using these labels had revealed that the first label was more associated with sociability and less with ability than the second with the third occupying an intermediary position.
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In the consistent condition, the group A profile used in Study 1 was attributed the 'pétanque' label and the group B profile the 'statisticians' label. Remember that, overall, group A was described as more sociable and less able than group B. Hence, in this condition, the labels were consistent with these overall differences. By contrast, in the 'inconsistent condition', the group A profile was attributed the 'researchers' label and group B the 'pétanque' label. Thus, the stereotypes associated with these labels were inconsistent with the overall profiles. In the no label condition, no label was presented (as in Study 1).
Given that participants were told that the profiles were made of behaviours that had been recorded by a social psychologist, the statements were not presented as part of a dialogue (as in Study 1) but in the third person (e.g. 'they like to walk in the woods').
Another difference from Study 1 was that no explicit consensus goal was imposed: as in Brauer et al. (2001) , participants had 10 min to discuss about the three groups. Half of the participants were told to first discuss the group they found the most sociable and the other half to first discuss the group they found the most intelligent.
Dependent measures
The same scales were used as in Study 1 although measures of recall were omitted because of time constraints. Eleven-point scales were used.
Results
Pooling
In order to analyse the content of the discussion, we used the same coding procedure as in Study 1 (Cohens's Kappa > 0.80). Based on these codings, we compared the likelihood of pooling a primary vs. secondary item of information using a label (consistent, inconsistent, neutral) Â information type (primary, secondary) ANOVA, the last factor being within-subjects. We found that group members were more likely to pool secondary (shared) than primary (unique) information as revealed by a main effect of type (Ms ¼ 0.42 and 0.36, F(1, 47) ¼ 14.53, p < 0.001). The interaction between type and label was not reliable, F(2, 47) ¼ 1.73, p ¼ 0.19. However, the simple effect of type was reliable in the consistent condition (Ms ¼ 0.44 and 0.30, F(1, 15) ¼ 4.96, p < 0.05) but not in the no label condition (Ms ¼ 0.42 and 0.35, F(1, 15) ¼ 2.20, p ¼ 0.20) . In the inconsistent label condition, the difference was negligible, (Ms ¼ 0.40 and 0.41, F < 1, ns).
In order to jointly test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we conducted separate univariate analyses on the pooling of primary and secondary information. In order to do so, we used two sets of contrasts codes assigning weights of À1, 0 and 1 (contrast 1) and À1, 2 and À1 (contrast 2) to the consistent, no label, and inconsistent condition respectively. The first set of codes tested for a linear increase from the consistent to the inconsistent condition. This contrast proved almost reliable for primary, t(47) ¼ 1.99, p ¼ 0.05 but not for secondary information, t(45) < 1, ns. The second contrast was not reliable in either case (ts < 1, ns), indicating that no quadratic relation was present over and above the linear trend.
Judgments of Sociability/Ability
Judgments were averaged (all alphas > 0.79 with one exception for the rating of intelligence of group A before discussion: alpha ¼ 0.56). These judgments were then submitted to a label Â type Â dimension Â time analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two factors.
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Did the manipulation of group label affect judgments? An interaction between label and type suggests a positive answer to this question, F(2, 45) ¼ 12.74, p < 0.01. These analyses revealed that at both times, 'primary' judgments (i.e. of the sociability of group A and ability of group B) were highest in the consistent condition (M ¼ 9.70) and lowest in the inconsistent condition (M ¼ 8.01) with the no label condition at an intermediate value (M ¼ 8.63 ). For secondary judgments, the reverse was observed (Ms ¼ 7.11, 7.80 and 8.26 in the consistent, no label and inconsistent conditions respectively). In other words, judgments were descriptively more 'accurate' in the consistent than in the inconsistent condition (see Figure 4) . However, the two-way interaction between label and type was moderated by time as revealed by a label Â type Â time interaction, F(2, 45) ¼ 2.81, p ¼ 0.07. In order to better understand this interaction, we analysed the simple effects of label on the accuracy score before and after discussion separately (see also Figure 4 ). Note that this index reflects the effect of information type and its variations therefore capture interactions involving this factor. The simple effects of label were reliable (F(2, 45) ¼ 15.13, p < 0.001 before discussion and F(2, 45) ¼ 8.89, p ¼ 0.001 after discussion). Multiple comparisons using Student Newman-Keuls' test indicated that the three means differed from each other before discussion in line with Hypotheses 1a and 1b: thus group members were more accurate in the consistent than no label condition and in the no label condition than in the inconsistent condition. By contrast, after discussion, mean levels of accuracy observed in the inconsistent and no label conditions did not differ from each other but were lower than those observed in the consistent condition.
Analyses of the simple effect of time as a function of condition indicated that in the inconsistent condition the mean level of accuracy changed as a function of discussion: after discussion, it was higher than before, F(1, 15) ¼ 9.16, p < 0.01. In the consistent and no label conditions, no reliable change was observed, Fs < 1, ns. Altogether, these two analyses indicate that judgments in the inconsistent condition were less influenced by sampling after than before discussion. The discussion Stereotype consensualization 771 seems to have increased the level of accuracy observed in this condition. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3a. By contrast, Hypothesis 3b was not supported: the simple effect of time was not reliable in the consistent condition, t < 1, ns.
Other effects of lesser theoretical importance emerged: main effects of type and of time indicated respectively that participants' judgments were higher on primary (M ¼ 8.78) than secondary traits (M ¼ 7.74, F(1, 45) ¼ 21.22, p < 0.001) and after (M ¼ 8.33) than before discussion (M ¼ 8.16, F(1, 45) ¼ 9.78, p < 0.001). The effect of type was stronger before than after discussion, as revealed by a time Â type interaction (before discussion, Ms ¼ 8.62 and 7.72; after discussion, Ms ¼ 8.95 and 7.62 for primary and secondary traits respectively; F(1, 45) ¼ 4.00, p ¼ 0.05). Effects involving the dimension factor were also observed: judgments were higher on ratings of sociability (M ¼ 8.50) than ability (M ¼ 7.99), F(1, 45) ¼ 52.15, p < 0.001.
Variances and Certainty
Just as in Study 1, variances in group judgments and judgments of perceived certainty were (separately) submitted to a similar analysis. As expected, variances decreased as a function of time (M ¼ 3.27 before discussion and M ¼ 2.49 after discussion, F(1, 45) ¼ 9.25, p < 0.005) in line with Hypothesis 4. Judgments of certainty increased as a function of time in line with Hypothesis 5 (Ms ¼ 7.95 at time 1 and M ¼ 8.69 at time 2, F(1, 45) ¼ 31.98, p < 0.001).
6
Choices
As consensus was not compulsory in this study, the analysis procedure used in Study 1 was not applicable. Rather, we submitted the proportion of group members within a small group who made correct choices to a label Â time Â dimension (sociability, ability) analysis of variance. This analysis revealed a main effect of time: a greater proportion of participants gave a correct answer after (M ¼ 0.59) than before discussion (M ¼ 0.53, F(1,45) ¼ 4.57, p < 0.05). However, this effect was qualified by an interaction between time and label, F(2,45) ¼ 2.64, p < 0.10: a simple effect analysis on the repeated factor indicated that this increase was significant in the inconsistent condition only (M ¼ 31 before, M ¼ 0.45 after discussion, F(1,15) ¼ 9.00, p < 0.01). In the no label condition (Ms ¼ 0.51 and M ¼ 0.49, F(1,15) ¼ 0.23, ns) and in consistent condition (M ¼ 0.79 and M ¼ 0.85, F(1,15) ¼ 1.55, ns), changes in the proportion of correct choices as a function of time were not reliable.
Discussion
In this second study, we tried to understand the impact of pre-existing beliefs on the consensualization of stereotypes in situations of biased sampling. We found that the presence of a label affected initial judgments in a direction consistent with the stereotype associated with this label. In line with Ruscher and Duval's findings (1998) , the presence of a label also influenced discussion in such a way that a given piece of information was generally more likely to be communicated when it was inconsistent with the expectations associated with the label than when it was consistent with these expectations. Moreover, whereas shared information was more likely to be pooled than unique information in the consistent and no label conditions, this was not true in the inconsistent condition. This finding is important in that it shows that the preference for the communication of shared information, widely documented in the decision-making literature (Stasser, 1991 (Stasser, , 1999 Wittenbaum & Park, 2001; Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996) , and sometimes viewed as unavoidable, is not a necessity: unique information is pooled in situations in which communicating such information appears more conversationally relevant than the communication of shared information, i.e. when it is more informative for the audience (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) .
Moreover, discussion had an effect on group judgments but only in the inconsistent condition: following discussion, group members were more likely to judge the two groups in line with the overall differences than before discussion. However, the opposite effect was absent when the label was consistent with the overall differences. Although participants in this condition discussed more secondary (i.e. stereotype-inconsistent) than shared (stereotype-consistent) information, they did not view the groups less accurately after than before discussion. These findings may be interpreted in light of Winquist and Larson's observation that, in decision-making groups, the discussion of unshared, but not shared information, has the potential to modify initial preferences (Winquist & Larson, 1998) . Indeed, for participants in the consistent condition, the information that was inconsistent with the label, and most likely to be discussed, was shared. It may therefore not have been capable of modifying initial judgments. By contrast, in the inconsistent condition, the information that was inconsistent with the label, and most likely to be pooled (compared to the two other conditions), was unshared. It may therefore had greater potential to change initial judgments.
Third, both within-group consensus and certainty increased as a function of discussion although there was no explicit consensus goal. Assuming that membership in these small discussion groups was meaningful to participants, these results provide evidence that discussion in intra-group contexts about the characteristics of a group spontaneously fosters consensus and that such consensus can lead to greater certainty. They confirm that the content of stereotypes is socially validated through social influence from peers (Haslam, 1997; .
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The first study presented in this article provides support for our assumption that sampling strongly affects the formation of consensual stereotypes regarding a target group. The impact of sampling on the content of emerging stereotypes seems to depend on its effect on individual preferences before discussion. Indeed, we found that, although participants had an opportunity to pool unshared information through discussion, their judgments were strongly influenced by their initial preferences, even when these preferences were inconsistent with the overall profile of the target groups because of biased sampling. We reasoned that pre-existing stereotypes may counteract or enhance this effect depending on whether they were consistent or not with the bias. We indeed found in Study 2 that a label that was inconsistent with the overall group profile could attenuate the impact of biased sampling on perceptions of the target groups by making participants more likely to communicate information that was congruent with the overall differences between these groups (but incongruent with the stereotype associated with the label). In communicating stereotype-inconsistent information, participants may have wanted to maximize the informative value of their utterances (Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1995) . In this regard, stereotypes seem to have been used as cues helping the speaker to determine which kind of information will be useful to the audience: they might be thought of as a form of common ground (Clark & Brennan, 1991) allowing discussants to foster a common understanding of the world as a function of the raw information available to the group.
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Besides its effects on the content of emerging representations, we found in the two studies that discussion also consensualized these judgments within groups and increased certainty. This consensualization process took two forms: -In Study 1, following dicussion, three-person groups varied less in their choices of the most sociable/able group than individuals did before discussion. -In both studies, within-group variability on the judgments of the two groups was smaller after than before discussion.
These finding are consistent with classic models of social influence (Festinger, 1950; Moscovici, 1976; Sherif, 1936; Turner, 1991) in showing that influence from other group members serves to subjectively construct and validate a shared interpretation of social reality.
Limitations
In assessing these results, it is important to bear in mind that participants were explicitly told that other group members did not share the same information as they did. When participants believe that others share the same information, they tend to communicate stereotype-consistent rather than stereotypeinconsistent information (Harasty, 1997; Ruscher, 2001; Ruscher & Duval, 1998; Ruscher, Hammer, & Hammer, 1996) . This may be because individuals are motivated to communicate consensual information as an attempt to maintain and enhance group cohesion (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty et al., 1998; . Besides, it is easier to participate in a smoothly flowing conversation on the basis of shared knowledge, such as stereotypes, than on the basis of idiosyncratic unshared (e.g. counterstereotypical) information (Clark & Brennan, 1991; Klein & Azzi, 2001) . In view of this analysis, future studies should investigate whether the effects observed in the second study generalize to situations in which participants do not expect to have information different from other group members.
Moreover, the account we presented here certainly simplifies a process that is often more complex. Indeed, it is generally an oversimplification to view stereotypes as 'individual' before they become 'social': the individual and social levels interact constantly [see, e.g. the cultivation perspective (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorelli, 1994) ]. Yet, it would be equally simplistic to view stereotypes as if they were uniform across individuals. Even if contextual factors affect stereotype content, individuals vary in their degree of endorsement of a stereotype over and above these factors (Christiansen, Kaplan, & Jones, 1999; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; McCauley & Thangavelu, 1991) . How these 'individual' representations combine themselves to form consensual stereotypes is a question that deserves our attention even if it is not the only route leading to the formation of shared stereotypes.
